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This paper is based on the hypothesis –put 
forward by the cognitive approach to eco-
nomic phenomena- that behaviour of eco-
nomic agents is driven by their mental repre-
sentations. 
We develop thus the insight that such repre-
sentations include not only beliefs and linguis-
tic statements but also iconic information in 
the form of mental images. When the symbolic 
meaning of mental images is taken into full 
account the whole process of knowledge con-
struction appears to be more complex than 
economic literature has held. 
In the traditional approaches to economic de-
cision-making, agents can develop only lin-
guistic knowledge that may be represented 
through "mental propositions" (Fodor, 1975). 
Already within the boundaries of this perspec-
tive, individuals process identical sensory 
stimuli in subjective ways, and therefore ob-
tain different knowledge. Our claim is, how-
ever, that the relevance of subjectivity in the 
context of economic choice is much wider, as 
the inclusion of imaginative thought in the 
cognitive repertoire of agents can help explain. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first 
part, mental images are interpreted as a 
method of knowledge representation charac-
terized by symbolic specificity and not reduci-
ble to language. On this theoretical ground, we 
then extend the "Image Theory" proposed by 
psychologists Beach and Mitchell (1987; 
1998) to economic decision-making. As a 
main consequence, a different "vision" of the 
economic agent emerges.  Roberta Patalano 
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"Imagination of the future, 
 like imagination of the past, are devices for 
living in the present" 
 (J. March) 
 
 
1. IMAGES IN THE ECONOMIC AGENT’S 
MIND 
 
Although mental images have been almost 
completely neglected by contemporary eco-
nomic theory, in the history of economic 
thought distinguished scholars, such as Simon, 
March, Shackle
1 and Boulding, have attributed 
a significant role to imagination, intended as 
production and representation of information 
in form of images. For reasons of synthesis, it 
is not possible to carry out a detailed historical 
reconstruction of this contributions. In this 
paragraph we will limit our attention to the 
pathbreking book entirely devoted to this topic 
by Kenneth Boulding, " The Image"  (1956)
2. 
"The Image" conceives mental images as a 
filter for perceptual data and mostly as inter-
face between human perception and knowl-
                                                 
1 According to Shackle (1955; 1972), the choice 
process can be thought of as being structured into 
the three following steps: the first, sequences of 
potential actions are imagined; the second, they 
undergo a screening process which tests their 
chance of becoming "real" in the decision maker’s 
vision of the world ("must be tested for possibil-
ity"); the third, each deemed possible sequence is 
evaluated on the basis of its desirability. 
At that last step, emotions and affects are deeply 
involved and function as choice criteria. Among the 
anticipations of future emotions "attached" to each 
deemed possible scenario, the one which offers "a 
good state of mind" is selected.  
To summarise: 
   Choice is among imagined options. 
   Imagination has limits. 
   It is used to build choice options. 
   It is constrained by subjective knowledge and 
interpretation of external reality. 
   It has emotional and affective roots.  
2For a critical review of this book, see Patalano and 
Rizzello (2003). 
edge. The author’s ideas refer to biology, eco-
nomics, political philosophy, organisation the-
ory, history and sociology, with a chapter 
dedicated to each of these disciplines. As a 
result, the book provides a wide and rich in-
terdisciplinary excursus. 
Every man has a self-image, which includes a 
picture of his place in space, his acknowl-
edgement of being part of a time flow, the 
perception of the universe around him as a 
world of regularities and the sensation of be-
ing part of a human relational network. He 
then has an image to evaluate reality  ("value 
image") which intervenes in his relationship 
with the external environment embedding in-
formation with meanings, an "affectional or 
emotional image" which provides him with 
feelings, attitudes and motivations, and an 
image concerning the degree of reality of his 
own perceptions. Finally, he has a public im-
age in which he compares his images with 
collectively shared images at different levels 
of consciousness.  
Knowledge is built up through a process of 
subjective selection and interpretation of ex-
ternal data whose organising principle is rep-
resented by the image; in this sense it func-
tions as an interface between input and output, 
where the latter can be either new knowledge 
or actions
3. Boulding’s excursus points out 
some identifying regularities of the image, 
apart from the conceptual context in which it 
is analysed, mainly its plasticity, its path-
dependence and its resistance to change. These 
constitutive features express both its tempo-
rary stability and its dynamic potentiality at 
the same time; the image contains elements 
which enhance its evolutionary tendency  as 
much as internal obstacles to its own devel-
opment. In the meanwhile, individual imagery 
                                                 
3 “…between the incoming and the outcoming mes-
sages lies the great intervening variable of the im-
age. The outgoing messages are the result of the 
image, not the result of the incoming messages. The 
incoming messages only modify the outgoing mes-
sages as they succed in modifying the image” 
(Boulding 1956, p.28). Images and Economic Behaviour 
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has a relevant social function because it en-
ables collective sharing of values and mean-
ings. From this point of view the image has 
cohesive power which may acquire a strategic 
value in organisational contexts and in co-
operative interaction. At the same time it may 
enhance the building up of collectively shared 
expectations about future market performance, 
to the extent to which a society is provided 
with a widespread information structure which 
reaches a large number of market niches. 
These phenomena of cohesion at the imagina-
tive level can, however, consolidate existing 
images thus making them more stable through 
self-enforcement processes, even when they 
are not adequate for interpreting external real-
ity. 
Despite its strong evocative power, in Bould-
ing’s analysis, the concept of image does not 
have a clear definition and, most of all, its 
relationships with other forms of mental repre-
sentation, such as beliefs, schemas and propo-
sitions is not specified. 
 
 
2. IMAGES OR WORDS? 
 
The nature of mental images is a very contro-
versial issue in the history of cognitive sci-
ence
4. In this paper we define mental images 
as representational formats that are character-
ized by a symbolic specificity which makes 
them different from linguistic statements.   
                                                 
4 The most inflamed controversy is between two 
opposite lines of thought: one is the so-called “pic-
torialist”, which argues that reducing mental images 
to more abstracts forms of representation will result 
in losing their figural peculiarity (Kosslyn 1980; 
1981; 1990; Pinker, 1984). On the contrary, accord-
ing to the “propositionalist” line of thought, images 
do not have  symbolic autonomy, and their nature is 
substantially propositional (Pylyshyn 1973, 1978, 
1981, 1984). A strong point in the pictorialist argu-
ment is the idea that the cognitive content depends 
on the means through which it is conveyed, while 
the propositionalists maintain that the content is 
independent of the form of representation that con-
veys it. 
In Kosslyn’s theory (1980; 1983), mental im-
ages have a visual-spatial nature that differen-
tiates them from language. They are generated 
on an interior screen with “grain” and more or 
less bright areas, the visual buffer. An image is 
produced on the buffer when given areas are 
operated, and is then lost, unless it is retained 
through a process of “visual rehearsal”. 
Before Kosslyn’s theory, pioneer experimental 
works on the connections between vision and 
imagination were carried out by Paivio
5 
(1971). Moreover, this connection is at the 
centre of a classical and long-debated issue in 
the philosophy of perception known as “Mo-
lyneux’s question” (Ferretti 1998)
6, whose 
basic question is whether or not we can as-
sume that senses share common properties. 
This debate has been very diversified, and for 
a long time there has been no convergence 
towards a definitive solution. Instead, today, 
psychological research allows us to come to an 
interesting conclusion based on the idea that 
vision is a complex system with a vertical and 
a horizontal dimension (Ferretti, 1998). At the 
level of low vision the perception of objects 
generates retinal images (this first process is 
impaired in a blind person); the data imprinted 
on the retina undergo further cognitive proc-
essing before creating the image which is the 
                                                 
5 In his experiments, Paivio underlined that it is 
easier to memorize a word list if one associates 
words with figures, and that the same effect can be 
reached by substituting real mental images for these 
figures. 
6“ In the second edition of the “Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding” (1694) John Locke added 
the  jocose problem his friend William Molyneux 
had suggested to him in a letter of March, 2 1693. 
Let us imagine a grown-up congenitally blind per-
son, who was taught how to tell a cube from a 
sphere of the same size and made of the same metal 
by touching them, so that he/she can say which is 
which; let us now assume that we put the sphere 
and the cube on a table and that the blind person is 
given back his/her sight; will he/she be able to tell 
which is the sphere and which is the cube by means 
of the sight and before touching them?”  (Ferretti 
1998, pp.120-121) Roberta Patalano 
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final product of vision (this second processing, 
characterizing high vision, is usually unim-
paired in a blind person). Therefore, if we can 
convey the same sensory information as in-
cluded in the retinal image through an unim-
paired perceptive canal - touch, for instance - 
to a congenitally blind person, he/she would 
be able to process it and “see” it in his/her 
mind (Cornoldi et al. 1992). Interesting ex-
periments have confirmed this result
7. A con-
genitally blind person can process figural im-
ages, since visual-spatial information, acquired 
through non-visual canals, is stored in his/her 
unimpaired visual buffer (Cornoldi et al. 
1992). Imagination and vision share similar 
information processing procedures, and the 
visual properties of mental images (creating 
their figural character) are developed by proc-
essing sensory data. The experimental results 
obtained using PET (Farah 1988) and studying 
patients whose visual cortex had been dam-
aged (Farah et al. 1988; Kosslyn 1994) have 
confirmed, also at a neurological level, the 
presence of a verticalising structure in the vis-
ual system
8.  
The relevance of these results for economic 
theory may be clarified by building a connec-
tion between the visual nature of images and 
the theory on human perception put forward 
                                                 
7 In these experiments the TVSS (Tactile Visual 
Substitution System) was used and designed by 
Paul Bach-y-Rita. It is made up of three elements: a 
closed-circuit camera fitted on glasses; a circuit 
transforming images recorded by the camera into 
electric impulses; a matrix of mechanical pins (tac-
tors) which reproduce the shape of the object re-
corded by the camera, according to the stimulus of 
electric impulses. During the experiment this matrix 
was laid on the back of a congenitally blind person, 
so that he/she had a tactile description of the object 
he/she had to make out. After a few attempts the 
subjects could guess what the camera was recording 
and they said they could even see the objects (Fer-
retti 1998). The visual processing used data re-
ceived through tactile perception, to the point that it 
became possible to “see through the skin”. 
8 The main reference is to  Kosslyn’s  model 
(1994). 
by the Nobel laureate in economics F. Hayek 
(1952). In "The Sensory Order" (Hayek, 1952) 
the mind is compared to a classifying structure 
which does not receive sensory stimuli pas-
sively but directs and interprets them. The 
processing of sensory stimuli is a subjective 
phenomenon that differentiates economic 
agents from each other. Even in contexts 
which - for reasons of simplicity – we might 
assume are identical for everybody, each 
agent’s behaviour depends on his/her  previ-
ous perceptive experience and genetic inheri-
tance. This thesis radically changes the tradi-
tional microeconomic view on the individual, 
as seen as a standard person (the representa-
tive agent) who is by definition deprived of 
his/her own individuality. Recent neurobio-
logical research (Damasio 1995; Fuster 1997; 
Paller 2001) has confirmed Hayek’s major 
intuitions 
We suggest that imaginative thought may be 
interpreted in the light of Hayek’s perspective 
on perception. According to Hayek, the differ-
ences between economic agents are due to the 
subjective nature of perception. Image produc-
tion adds a new root for subjectivity, as it in-
volves genetic inheritance and perceptual ex-
perience built up in personal living at several 
levels, which go from the lowest retinic level 
to the subsequent processing of visual stimuli. 
This result deserves, however, further investi-
gation since the literature on cognitive dynam-
ics in economics has so far assumed that indi-
viduals develop mainly propositional knowl-
edge.  
In the following paragraphs we will argue that 
many of Boulding’s intuitions, and specifically 
the close connection between images and be-
haviour, are still valid in the light of a new 
approach to decision-making that emerged in 
psychology.  
 
3. "IMAGE THEORY"  
 
“Image Theory” was proposed by the psy-
chologists Beach and Mitchell in the middle 
80s as a descriptive theory of human decision 
making in which individual knowledge is rep-Images and Economic Behaviour 
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resented through mental images.  When faced 
with a decision problem, the decision-maker 
refers to four images: 
1.  The self image which consists of personal 
values, beliefs, ethics that guide one’s adop-
tion (or rejection) of goals  and contribute to 
the generation of potential new ones; 
2.  The  trajectory image which is a mind 
picture of one’s desirable future, given the self 
image; 
3.  The action image which basically consists 
of plans (intended as sequences of actions) 
currently used by the subject to achieve his 
goals; 
4.  The  projected image, which mirrors the 
expected future (in terms of the anticipated 
results of plans), if one persists with plans that 
are currently adopted.  
A decision consists of adopting or rejecting 
new candidates as constitutive elements of 
one’s images ("adoption decision"), or of 
evaluating whether progress towards goals has 
been made or not ("progress decision"). Deci-
sions are made according to two evaluative 
criteria, one based on compatibility and the 
other on profitability. Both these criteria are 
implemented through computational tests 
(Beach 1998). As a result of the compatibility 
test, a candidate is rejected for adoption if the 
number of its violations of the relevant image 
constituents exceeds a subjective rejection 
threshold: in other words, it is rejected if its 
compatibility turns out to be too low in the 
personal evaluation of the decision maker. 
Among the compatible candidates, the one 
which maximizes the probability of reaching 
the desirable goals is selected: it is in fact the 
potentially most profitable candidate.     
The main contention of Image Theory is that 
the foundation of individual decision making 
needs to be found in the compatibility desire 
with one’s self-image; this desire drives hu-
man actions as much as the attempt to avoid 
self conflict acts as a guideline
9.   
                                                 
9 “Whatever one’s principle may be, they are the 
foundation of one’s decisions (…). Our contention 
is that the motivation for profit, for gain, for ad-
In Beach and Mitchell’s analysis
10 (1987) 
many isolated attitudes of the decision-maker 
are underlined but a synthetic portrait of his 
abilities and cognitive features is not explicitly 
developed. According to our interpretations, 
the Image Theory’s subject could be described 
as follows. 
   He has personal beliefs and basic values 
that are organised in a network of connections 
and built up over time; those principles are 
time dependent variables because they appear 
to be a product of the individual history and 
because they can be regarded as dynamic and 
continually exposed to change. He uses his 
imagination at least as much as his rationality. 
   He has reasonable expectations about his 
future but also desires and dreams about the 
life which, potentially, could be his own. 
   He has an innate ability to build imagi-
nary scenarios and to regard himself as a part 
of them. 
   He is able to change his self image 
throughout time. 
                                                                
vancement, and the values of outcome that contrib-
ute to them derives from the degree to which those 
outcomes promote and comply with the decision 
maker’s principles. It is compatibility that is the 
key” (Beach 1998, p.9). 
10 An interesting extension to organization theory 
was  proposed by Mitchell, Rediker e Beach (1998) 
stemming from the idea that each organization has 
its own “identity” and acts to preserve it. From this 
point of view they share Selznick’s following opin-
ion: “The study of institutions is in some ways 
comparable to the clinical study of personality. In 
both personality and institutions, “self-
preservation” means more than bare organic or 
material survival. Self-preservation has to do with 
the maintenance of basic identity, with the integrity 
of a personal or institutional “self”.”(1957, p.141). 
Organizational identity, as well as individual iden-
tity, can be described with reference to four images: 
the organizational self-image, the organizational 
trajectory image, the organizational projected image 
and the organizational action image. A relevant 
meaning is attributed by the authors to the mecha-
nisms of resistance to change, as much as to the role 
played by “doubt” and its appropriate expression in 
organizational contexts. Roberta Patalano 
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   He needs "stories" more than single data. 
In making a decision he does not examine a 
list of disconnected information but imaginary 
plots that are embedded with emotions and 
affective dispositions. 
   He tries to avoid conflict and to act in 
coherence with his personal living.         
 
4. DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
COMPARED 
 
In the neoclassical paradigm, choices are in-
tended as results of a computational process 
which maximises the expected utility of out-
comes that are weighted in term of probabili-
ties. This approach involves an axiomatic con-
cept of rationality, according to which ration-
ality is a behavioural rule and consists of se-
lecting that strategy which best solves the 
maximisation problem. In this paragraph the 
neoclassical approach is called “traditional 
decision-making”. We would rather classify 
those branches of decision theory that have 
been developed as an alternative to the neo-
classical one, starting both from experimental 
research programs and Herbert Simon’s work 
and legacy as “non traditional”. The most sig-
nificant difference between the image based 
approach, IT, traditional decision-making, 
TDM, and non traditional decision theories, 
NTDM, may be found in the decision-maker’s 
description. These approaches will be now 
compared, in order to suggest a fuller under-
standing of their theoretical implications. In 
the comparison we make reference to five 
conceptual categories: decisional mechanisms; 
choice criteria; context influence; relevance of 
past experiences and space for individuality. 
 
1. Decisional Mechanisms 
TDM: the representative agent is provided 
with an abstract decisional mechanism, maxi-
misation of utility, and with the "instruments" 
needed to apply it: perfectly distributed infor-
mation, instrumental rationality and unlimited 
computational abilities. When the maximisa-
tion procedure is used, it leads to an optimal 
choice whose subsequent shifting from the 
abstract model to the external environment is 
identified with taking the best possible action. 
NTDM: the decision-maker has incomplete 
information, limited computational abilities 
and bounded rationality. He is influenced by 
the modality and channels of information 
transmission, and beginning from external 
data, develops his knowledge through a per-
sonal and context dependent mental process. 
His choices are sub-optimal but "satisficing", 
in accordance with a subjective and variable 
aspiration threshold.  
IT: the decision maker hasn’t got any abstract 
decisional rule, but only a bunch of principles 
that are developed both through learning and 
personal experiences and are stratified over 
time in his self-image. He works on external 
data by including them in mental representa-
tions; through this process of adaptation of 
new incoming messages to formerly existing 
cognitive structures, he builds up his knowl-
edge. His own network of goals, plans and 
beliefs can be recalled either by external stim-
uli, e.g. a new option to act, or internal ones, 
e.g. the perception of a discrepancy between 
expected and effective achievements of his 
performed plans. A search for the solution 
which best fits his images begins from this 
recall.  
 
2. Choice Criteria 
TDM: constrained maximisation of expected 
utility. 
NTDM: search mainly based on heuristics; 
breakdown of the original task into sub-
problems that can be solved independently; 
exploitation of already experimented routines 
or attempts at developing new ones. 
IT: two criteria are subsequently applied: ac-
cording to the compatibility rule the principles, 
goals and plans that are most compatible with 
existing images are selected, while the profit-
ability test leads the subject to choose the can-
didate from which the greatest closeness to 
desirable goals is expected.   
 
3. Context Dependence Images and Economic Behaviour 
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TDM: the maximisation procedure is abstract 
and independent from the decision content, it 
may be applied in any situation and may be 
perfectly transferred from one context to an-
other.  
NTDM: the behavioural routines are selected 
case by case, according to the decision-at-hand 
requirements, and then they exhibit strong   
context dependence; the chance of partial 
transfer depends on their adaptability from 
experimented situations to analogous ones.  
IT: each situation may activate different work-
ing images or connections among them, so 
choices appear to be strongly dependent on 
context and are weakly transferable. 
 
4. Past Experiences 
TDM: personal history has no relevance at all 
since the decisional mechanism does not in-
deed depend on individuality, but is com-
pletely anonymous and immutable over time. 
Experience already acquired is not linked to 
decisional skills, it could exist in somebody 
else’s mind and could be transmitted to the 
decision-maker in the form of new informa-
tion. 
NTDM:  external stimuli are interpreted sub-
jectively and the building up of knowledge is 
essentially based on interaction between men-
tal schemes and experiences. This also ex-
plains why, when exposed to the same infor-
mation, individuals may have diversified 
knowledge: decisions are strongly path-
dependent as much as mental schemes are and 
as are the neural maps which contribute to 
them.    
IT: personal experience represents the cogni-
tive and affective background that enables the 
generation of images. The whole decision 
process depends on it.  
 
5. Space for Individuality 
TDM: the link between choices and personal 
values is not a direct one, it reveals itself 
through individual preferences which are, 
however, considered as exogenous. Agents 
could be entirely replaced by each other and 
their subjectivity has no place if not as a list of 
data. 
NTDM: information processing, choice of 
heuristics and frame building are embedded 
with individuality as are the decisions that are 
based on them. 
IT: images are an individual resource and their 
generation also involves unconscious elements 
which are subjective; on the other hand, image 
components are mainly connected by affective 
and emotional links. The theory makes explicit 
reference to personal beliefs, desires, motiva-
tions and goals. Relationships among these 
constitutive elements are endogenous. 
 
5. PROPOSALS FOR AN “EXTENDED 
VISION” 
 
In this paragraph some possible connections 
between Hayek’s theory,  Boulding’s ideas, 
and the new Image Theory will be highlighted, 
so as to suggest a possible interpretation. 
Imagination has been included among the ba-
sic ingredients of economic decisions by theo-
rists of world fame (Boulding, March, 
Shackle, Simon), although it was almost com-
pletely neglected in the traditional decision-
making theory. These contributions contain 
important intuitions and can be fruitfully inte-
grated with the recent neuropsychological 
achievements on the nature and function of 
mental images. In the light of these proceed-
ings, imagination cannot be meant simply as 
an instrument to fill information gaps concern-
ing the future. If, as underlined by Newell and 
Simon (1972), intermediate imaginary stages 
may be found between the initial stage of a 
problem and its final solution, IT suggests that 
images also contain the possible solutions, the 
paths that can be followed to reach them and 
the obstacles that might block the research 
process or lead them towards one direction or 
another. The solutions are chosen only among 
those elements that are considered to be com-
patible with the already acquired values, and 
the threshold of compatibility separates the 
paths that can be followed from the ones that 
cannot, within the set of existing images. This Roberta Patalano 
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situation in which a subject makes choices by 
minimising the conflicts with his/her own val-
ues may be compared to a kind of temporary 
equilibrium, since, in the long term, the feed-
back with the external reality and the plastic 
nature of the mind tend to modify those im-
ages and, as a consequence, it is possible that 
individual views evolve in unforeseen direc-
tions. 
Image Theory also leads one to reconsider the 
concept of rationality by outlining the close 
link between rationality and imagination, 
when the former is meant in a broader sense 
than the one that is traditionally fashionable 
among economists. The introduction of imagi-
nation among the basic ingredients of deci-
sion-making does not drive one to fantasy-
drawn agents, instead of rational subjects, but 
rather it suggests a broadening of the cognitive 
substrates on which logic can exert its influ-
ence. It does this by including a set of imag-
ined scenarios in the "traditional" list of in-
formational data. Upon this set that is built up 
by the agent, logic intervenes to select one 
from among the possible choice options.  
Images, as well as mental representations, 
seem to be structurally characterised by biases; 
the latter are due to their nature of incomplete 
substratum, a storehouse of impressions. Nev-
ertheless, this characteristic rather than a limit 
is a resource which makes it possible to reach 
fluidity characterising, in Boulding’s words, 
imaginative thought. In the literature on prob-
lem solving, re-framing is a key which makes 
it possible to come out of lock-in situations 
(Egidi 2002; Egidi and Narduzzo 1997). Simi-
larly, the possibility to re-interpret is the key to 
the creative abilities that are inherent in imagi-
native processes. Actually, the mainly conser-
vative inclination of the compatibility test in-
dicates that, in this case as well as with refer-
ence to mental representations, subjects tend 
to resist changing their own views. 
The presence of resistance mechanisms, one of 
the pioneer ideas in Boulding’s analysis, is one 
more unifying element among different cogni-
tive phenomena, and it sheds new light on the 
analysis of the processes of change. Specifi-
cally, Boulding proposes images which may 
not evolve or perceive external messages. IT 
attributes this possibility to a specific point in 
the interaction between images and possible 
decisions, i.e. the compatibility test. Subjects 
tend to act coherently with their own values 
and basic aspirations, trying to avoid a conflict 
with their self-image as much as possible. 
Change is therefore an essentially endogenous 
process, with its roots in the subject’s mind, 
not only because mental patterns keep evolv-
ing - as already argued in literature (Rizzello 
1999) -, but also because individual behaviour 
depends on the images directing it, and it can 
change only if those images change. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The economic literature on decision-making 
has recently contributed to integrating 
achievements made in different fields, such as 
experimental economics, cognitive psychol-
ogy, neurosciences and artificial intelligence, 
within a unique approach that is known as 
cognitive economics. Its research program 
aims at finding foundations for individual and 
collective behaviour in the functioning 
mechanisms of the mind. 
Within this approach, however, an analysis of 
the roles played by imagination is still lacking. 
Such a topic is surprisingly neglected although 
it was once largely investigated by well-
known economists, such as Boulding, Shackle, 
March and Simon. In Simon’s work on prob-
lem solving, imagination is devised as an in-
strument which helps fill the informative gaps 
about the unknown future. In our opinion this 
way of dealing with the topic is too restrictive. 
As highlighted by Image Theory, imagination 
has many more substantial functions, most of 
all that of minimising cognitive and emotional 
conflict.   
The analysis of imagining also allows a deeper 
understanding of the concept of differentiated 
cognitive agents, as initially shaped by Hayek. 
A "cognitive" agent may be identified with a 
subject that is endowed with mental represen-Images and Economic Behaviour 
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tations that guide his behaviour. More specifi-
cally: 
   He creates representations of the world in 
which he lives and of his desires and inten-
tions by using means which include proposi-
tions, schemes and images; 
    He has personal beliefs  that are partially 
organised into coherent systems, his theories; 
   He acts on the basis of his mental repre-
sentations in a double sense. Both because his 
goals and plans are influenced by the contents 
and the format of his representation and be-
cause his behaviour is oriented towards the 
achievement of goals that have been pre-
represented in his mind ("representation-
driven behavior", Castelfranchi 2002); 
   He acts in situations which exhibit struc-
tural uncertainty.  
Among the mental representations that drive a 
cognitive agent’s behaviour, images appear to 
be endowed with symbolic meanings which 
contribute to shape individuality. The subjec-
tive roots of economic behaviour are then en-
riched and actually represents a crucial en-
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